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We rigorously investigate the multifaceted effects of financial regulation and supervision on 
bank stability using panel data for 2210 banks across 47 European countries over the period 
2000–2016.  The CAMELS rating system is applied to quantile regressions.  We find that 
greater capital regulation is positively associated with bank stability, whilst tighter 
restrictions, deposit insurance and excess of supervision appear to exert an adverse effect on 
bank stability.  These effects are more pronounced among banks at a higher level of stability.  
It also appears that commercial banks, smaller banks and banks in emerging countries are 
relatively sensitive to regulatory shocks.   
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1.  Introduction 
The controversy about the relationship between regulation and stability has created practical 
questions, whether strict regulation besides supervision are appropriate for all financial 
markets and institutions, and which type of regulation can be pursued. For example, Barth et 
al. (2004), Pasiouras et al. (2006), Pasiouras et al. (2009), Barakat and Hussainey (2013) and 
Delis (2015) highlight the need for tighter financial regulation to promote financial stability 
and the importance of building stable buffers to meet any financial distress. On the other 
hand, some researchers have argued that stricter regulation may destabilise the financial 
system. Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) stated that onerous regulation may be a hindrance to 
the ability of banks to provide financial resources for economic sectors. Such regulation may 
also have an adverse effect on bank competition leading to higher loan rates and to 
potentially a higher probability of loan defaults.   Note that Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2011) did not find any significant positive impact of regulation and supervision on financial 
stability.  
 In this paper, we rigorously investigate the multifaceted effects of regulation together 
with supervision on bank stability using a large data set of an unbalanced panel of 2210 banks 
across 47 European countries over the period 2000–2016.   Our study distinguishes itself 
from existing studies in the following manner:  Whilst most financial stability research has 
suffered from inadequate measurement of stability scores (Wanke et al., 2016), we adopt a 
CAMELS-DEA rating system as a stability indicator.  CAMELS is an acronym for categories 
of financial variables encountered in the financial literature, referring to capital adequacy (C), 
asset quality (A), management efficiency (M), earnings (E), liquidity (L) and sensitivity to 
market risk (S), and DEA is data envelopment analysis.  Our study combines this system with 
a quantile regression technique to take account of varying levels of stability across banks.  
We also consider the multifaceted influences of regulation and supervision with variations in 
business models, bank size and economic development.   
 Several studies have investigated the concept of financial stability, however, debate 
regarding the precise definition of financial stability has been ongoing.  Crockett (1997) 
considered stability in both institutions and markets, whereby stability in financial institutions 
may refer to the absence of stress, and stability in the financial market may refer to the 
absence of volatile price movements.  Issing (2003) defines financial stability as a system 
which can guarantee an efficient allocation of savings in order to enhance investment 
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opportunities. In a similar vein, the European Central Bank (2005) interprets financial 
stability as a system which can provide continued support for an economy. Borio (2003) 
expounded financial stability based on two main paradigms of the micro-prudential and 
macro-prudential.  See also Garry and Schinasi (2004).  The complexity of identifying 
financial stability leads to different ways of quantifying such stability for an empirical work. 
The widely used indicator at the micro-level is the Z-score (Altman 1968, Altman et al.1977, 
Boyd and Graham 1986, Hannan and Hanweck 1988 and Uhde and Heimeshoff 2009), which 
reflects the probability of default in the banking system. However, this indicator suffers from 
several limitations. The Z-score is based purely on an accounting and auditing framework, 
and, hence, it does not take into account other sources of risk such as the sensitivity of market 
risk or management risk (Čihák et al. 2012 and Creel et al. 2015).  Iannotta (2007) used loan 
loss provision (LLP) to total loans as a proxy for banking credit risk.  At a macro-level, 
Loayza and Ranciere (2006) utilised the standard deviation of private credit to GDP so as to 
capture financial fragility. In addition, Hollo et al. (2012) developed a financial stability 
measurement through a composite indicator of systemic stress (CISS).    
 Männasoo and Mayes (2009) propose CAMELS indicators that appear to have a 
significant ability to detect any financial distress, hence the related financial variables of the 
CAMELS acronym have been adopted in several studies.  See, for example, Cole and 
Gunther (1995), DeYoung (1998), Kumar and Ravi (2007) and Poghosyan and Čihák (2009).  
Avkiran and Cai (2012) presented empirical evidence which emulated the CAMELS rating 
system in Australian bank holding companies through the use of a non-parametric technique, 
DEA.  Avkiran and Cai emphasised that DEA can be utilised as a forward-looking substitute 
method that assists in detecting financial distress in the near future.  More recently, Wanke et 
al. (2015) and Wanke et al. (2016) also examined the CAMELS rating system in Brazilian 
and Malaysian banks by using DEA, and proved that the CAMELS with DEA is an 
appropriate method to uncover  any financial distress.   
 We apply the CAMELS-DEA rating system to the quantile regression (QR) method
1
.  
Then means that the dependent variable, bank stability, estimated by the CAMELS-DEA is 
distinguished by its variations in the level of stability.  The approach is appropriate for 
discovering whether bank stability is related to our explanatory indicators at different points 
of bank stability distribution. This has a number of advantages.  The traditional inference 
                                                          
1
 QR is developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978). 
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methods such as ordinary least squares (OLS) or least absolute deviations (LAD) are 
developed to describe average behaviour of a sample (Lee and Li 2012).  It is argued that 
these methods exhibit rather poor descriptions, especially with the presence of heterogeneity 
in the sample.  There is a two-step estimation procedure where the sample is partitioned 
based on a particular factor and then the conventional econometrics estimation is applied.  
This enables us to conduct a comparative analysis between the partitioned segments.  The 
drawback of this method is, however, the potentially invalid empirical results due to sample 
selection bias.  The QR circumvents the limitation of the two-step analysis.  Moreover, the 
QR approach allows us to explore a range of conditional quantile functions, thereby exploring 
various forms of conditional heterogeneity (Lee and Li 2012).   It is further argued that since 
sample segmentation and non-uniform relations between the dependent variable and the 
explanatory variables are simultaneously determined, the QR is able to deal with the potential 
limitations in prior studies that assume segmentation of the sample is exogenous (Lee and Li 
2012).  The QR is employed in various finance studies.  Among others, Engle and Manganelli 
(2004) for the study of VaR, Chuang et al. (2009) for the return-volume relation in the stock 
market and Cappiello et al. (2010) for the impact of the Euro on stock markets.  To the best 
of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to apply the QR models to testing the effect 
of financial regulation and supervision on bank stability.  Note that this proved to be a 
plausible approach, since different results are found at varying levels of stability in banks.       
 Many studies have examined the influence of banks’ business models on financial 
stability.  For example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) find that banks with a high 
degree of diversified activities may produce more risks. Altunbas et al. (2011) stated that 
banks’ business models that shape an aggressive credit growth and large balance sheets may 
face distress, conversely, any bank business model that is based on high deposits coupled 
with significant diversification of assets is less likely to face financial distress. Likewise, 
Ayadi et al. (2012) argue that retail-oriented banks are more profitable and stable, compared 
with other types of financial institutions.  See also Köhler (2015) and Mergaerts and Vander 
Vennet (2016).  Mergaerts and Vander Vennet (2016) argue that heterogeneity among banks’ 
business models may have different reactions to prudential regulation and methods of 
supervision.   
 The debate about the effect of bank size on financial stability has also gained much 
attention since it was evident that the crisis which originated in the large global banks, has 
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spread the source of financial distress across many countries.  The agency theory suggests 
that managers who run large banks can gain private benefits and obtain more compensation 
(Murphy 1985, Jensen 1986 and Gabaix and Landier 2008). With this perspective, it is 
possible to observe a negative relationship between bank size and financial stability.  On the 
other hand, the stewardship theory presents a manager of a large bank as an inherently 
trustworthy person, and it is unlikely that such a person misappropriates a bank’s resources 
(Davis et al. 1997).  It is also argued that a large bank may reflect structural convenience, 
which may reinforce financial stability (Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  These studies suggest 
that a sensitivity to regulatory shocks may vary according to a bank’s size.     
 Demirg et al. (1998) investigated the determinants of banking distress across 
developing and emerging countries. They discovered that structural characteristics of the 
financial system together with a weak macroeconomic environment play key roles in 
increasing the probability of financial distress, especially in less-developed countries.  
Further, Čihák et al. (2012) and Wen and Yu (2013) find that there are significant variations 
in the relationship between financial depth and financial stability across high-income and 
low-income countries. It is argued that this is due to the different propagation of financial 
distress and the sources of stress.  Weak early warning indicators in emerging economies are 
also said to influence the variations in the financial stability and the related determinants 
(Babecký et al., 2014). 
 The above arguments warrant investigation of the effects of regulation and 
supervision on bank stability in terms of banks' business models, size and the stage of 
economic development.   
 Our empirical work reveals the following main findings:  In general, capital 
regulation has a positive influence on stability across all quantiles, i.e. all banks with various 
levels of stability.  Such factors as concentrated markets and economic freedom also exert a 
favourable effect on bank stability.  This is contrasted with the activity restrictions, deposit 
insurance, monitoring and supervision which have shown to adversely affect banks.  These 
effects tend to be more pronounced in banks with a high level of stability.  Note also that 
there appears to be a heterogenous effect across different business types of bank, bank size 
and economic development.  In particular, commercial banks, smaller banks and also banks 
in emerging countries, albeit to a lesser degree, tend to be more sensitive to shocks in 
financial regulation and supervision.  The empirical results found in this paper should serve 
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to provide guidance for financial policymakers in designing and setting bank regulation and 
supervision.    
 Our study contributes to the literature in two ways.  Firstly, our findings based on the 
QR method may reconcile the mixed results in the literature of the relation between 
regulation and stability.  This may be due to the fact that the quantile approach considers the 
various distributions of the dependent variable that is not featured by the central distribution 
tendency.   Secondly, we, in general, find well-determined coefficients, suggesting that a 
proper evaluation of the effect of regulation on bank stability may be the use of the multi-
dimensional stability indicators by capturing banks' soundness with the combination of inputs 
and outputs indicators.     
 The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the relevant literature on 
the effects of regulation and supervision on bank stability.  Other determinants are also 
discussed in this section. In Section 3, we describe the model specification, variables and 
data. The empirical results are presented in Section 4, and we conclude in Section 5.  
2. The relevant literature 
2.1  Effects of bank regulations, supervision and internal monitoring on stability 
It is pointed out that capital-requirement regulation is one of the key instruments to enhance 
financial stability.  Boot and Greenbaum (1992) and Besanko and Kanatas (1993), however, 
pointed out that a strict capital requirement decreases monitoring power. Moreover, Hakenes 
and Schnabel (2011) argue that a stringent capital requirement attenuates competition for 
loans, and thereby banks raise loan rates, leading to an increasing  probability of default 
among borrowers.  Nonetheless, an effective capital requirement is considered a useful 
instrument to absorb losses and to act as a buffer.  Kim and Santomero (1988) showed the 
way in which a capital requirement can redress the bias towards risk. Further, strict capital 
requirements could prompt banks to reduce risky lending (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004). 
Furlong and Keeley (1989) added that adequate capital requirements may maximise banks’ 
values by enhancing investors’ confidence,  boosting banks' reputations and their franchise 
values (Repullo  2004).  
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 With respect to the influence of restrictions in non-traditional financial activities such 
as insurance, securities and property on financial stability, there are conflicting propositions.  
It is argued that tight restrictions may boost monitoring due to low-complexity banking 
activities, coupled with a reduction in informational asymmetries.  However, relaxing 
restrictions enables banks to gain the benefits of diversifying their products. This may affect 
financial services and assist banks to provide more efficient services and enhance bank 
stability (Barth et al., 2004).  See also Laeven and Levine (2007) and Barth et al. (2013b).  
 Deposit insurance is deemed to offer a safety buffer within the financial system. The 
deposit guarantee can boost depositors’ confidence and reduce the role of government with 
regard to banks' obligations in the face of financial shocks (Anginer et al. 2014 and 
Constantinescu 2015).  Santomero (1997) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), 
however, highlight that deposit insurance may increase the incentive for banks to take risks. 
Moreover, achieving an optimal deposit insurance scheme with an appropriate structure is an 
arduous task, with governments potentially absorbing all losses. This accelerates the tendency 
of banks to take further risks, which makes them more vulnerable to financial shocks (Cull et 
al. 2005, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2008 and Chernykh and Cole 2011). 
 In the case of official supervision, in general, it is argued that it could overcome 
market failure caused by imperfect information. Such supervision, together with enhanced 
monitoring and disciplining of banks, could consequently boost the governance of bank 
lending and reduce corruption (Beck et al. 2006b). In particular, it is argued that active 
supervisory agencies improve banks’ efficiency and their ability to face any financial distress 
(Barth et al. 2004 and Barth et al. 2013b).  Yet, it is counter-argued that supervisors may 
concentrate on promoting self-interest.  For example, based on a self-interest hypothesis, 
supervisors may be able to conceal some supervisory information and to exchange it for 
private benefits (Boyer and Ponce, 2012), impeding financial stability (Beck et al. 2006b and 
Barth et al. 2013b).  Additionally, powerful and more independent supervisors working in a 
weak governance-environment may hamper prudential supervision, creating a financial 
system which is less resistant to financial shocks (Melecky and Podpiera, 2013).  It is also 
argued that supervision has varying impacts from country to country and from one financial 
environment to another (Ben Bouheni, 2014). In general, powerful and independent 
supervisory authorities in a well-developed financial system are less prone to financial 
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shocks, while supervisory authorities in poor financial-governance environments could be 
more sensitive to financial distress (Chortareas et al. 2012).  
 Banks' internal monitoring is believed to reduce credit risk through the reduction of 
asymmetric information problems between banks and borrowers (Winton, 1995). It also 
enhances internal governance and thereby boosts stability in financial institutions.  It is 
almost a consensus about the active role of governance in enhancing stability in the financial 
system.  Kirkpatrick (2009) provided substantial evidence that weaknesses in the 
implementation of governance principles have contributed to the failures of banks, as well as 
poor risk management due to inaccuracies in conveying information and also an inadequate 
disclosure of predicted risk. 
2.2     Effects of market structure, institutional quality and economic environment on 
stability 
There are two conflicting views on the relationship between concentration (or competition) 
and financial stability (Uhde and Heimeshoff 2009 and Fu et al. 2014).  The traditional view 
adopts the concentration–fragility perspective.  Highly concentrated banking systems may 
boost market power, reducing competition in financial services.  This may lead to increased 
loan rates and the market becomes prone to loan defaults  (Beck et al. 2006a).  See also Fu et 
al. (2014).  On the other hand, the concentration–stability advocators emphasise that high 
concentration produces greater competition in an optimal market structure, obliging banks to 
lower interest rates. Further, concentration in the financial system may tend to lead to larger, 
better-diversified banks, which enhances stability in banking. Moreover, banks in a 
concentrated financial system are less prone to insolvency because of a strong capital buffer. 
It is also argued that the possibility of economies of scale and scope would enable them to 
achieve higher profits (Mirzaei and Moore, 2014).  Regulators find that fewer market players 
can improve effective supervision, enhance monitoring and reduce the risk of contagion 
across banks  (Beck et al., 2006a).  
 During the financial crisis, governments adopted a majority of stakes in most of the 
beleaguered financial institutions through bailouts in developed countries. This started the 
debate about whether government-owned banks enhance financial soundness (Nsengiyumva 
2016).   Three alternative theories can explain the relationship between government 
ownership and financial stability: the social, political and agency theories. The classical view 
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is based on the social perspective, which suggests that government ownership is instrumental 
in addressing market failures, thus improving public welfare (Stiglitz 1993).  The political 
perspective considers government-owned banks as a tool for implementing the individual 
goals of politicians (Shleifer and Vishny 1994), e.g. providing financial support for favoured 
enterprises or increasing employment for their supporters (Shleifer 1998). The agency 
perspective shares features with the social perspective to the extent that it aims to improve 
social welfare, however, this perspective generates weak management, misallocation of funds 
and corruption as a result of government bureaucracy (Banerjee, 1997).  Hence, if the 
political or agency hypothesis holds, the government-owned banks may be a cause of 
instability.    
 The liberty of individuals and institutions is one of the most important pillars of 
economic development that has been pursued to achieve economic goals and to improve 
financial stability. Financial institutions can efficiently control their costs and reduce risk 
through the reduction of constraints (Chortareas et al. 2013).  It surely exerts a preferable 
impact on the development of  financial intermediaries (Hafer 2013).  It is also argued that a 
high level of economic freedom creates greater political stability and thus reduces uncertainty 
in the financial system (Blau et al. 2014).   
 Significant academic efforts have aimed to identify the link between macroeconomic 
indicators and financial stability. Such as economic growth and inflation are found to affect 
the level of bank capitalisation and the quality of banks' assets (Schaeck and Cihak 2012).  
For example, Ayuso et al. (2004) and Jokipii and Milne (2008) argued the need for steady 
economic growth to enhance banks' capital buffers and improve financial soundness.  Boyd et 
al. (2005) provided strong evidence that unstable economic growth increases uncertainty 
about a financial system’s future.  With regard to inflation, it is often seen as an obstacle to 
stability in the financial markets.  An inflationary environment may raise a bank’s incentive 
to increase loan rates so banks may gain more income.  Hence, it may impede financial 
soundness by increasing the probability of borrowers' default (Tan and Floros 2012).   
3.  Methodology, variables and data 
3.1  Methodology 
The study utilises the CAMELS-DEA model for estimating a dependent variable, i.e. bank 
stability.  The estimated bank stability is then regressed on regulations, supervision and other 
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determinants in order to investigate the multifaceted effects on financial stability.  A quantile 
regression (QR) is applied for estimation.   
 Bank behaviour studies usually rely on a one-dimensional risk indicator such as a Z-
score, non-performing loans, credit ratings, return on equity or capital ratios. These indicators 
do not reflect bank-specific characteristics and may contain some measurement errors 
because of differences in measurement for on- and off-balance issues (Klomp and De Haan, 
2012).  There is, therefore, doubt about the ability of these indicators to capture banking risk. 
Although a non-unique set of indicators exists, the CAMELS indicators appear to have a 
significant capacity to assess banks’ soundness with their combination of indicators  (Wanke 
et al. 2016).  We adopt the CAMELS combination as a proxy of bank stability. The financial 
dimensions of this combination are employed by regulators and supervisors to assess banks' 
overall health (Avkiran and Cai 2012, Klomp and De Haan 2012, Wanke et al. 2015, Wanke 
et al. 2016, Buch et al. 2016 and Calabrese et al. 2017).  The original criteria of the categories 
of CAMELS ratings are, however, undisclosed and unavailable to the public, hence the proxy 
of each category is selected, based on data availability and prior studies (Jin et al. 2011, 
Avkiran and Cai 2012 and Wanke et al. 2016).   
 The components of CAMELS are as follows:  Capital adequacy (C) is captured by 
total equity and treated as a desirable output. It should be maximised when more equity is 
conducive to less financial distress. Asset quality (A) is captured by loan loss provisions 
(LLP), which is an undesirable input and should be minimised. In a similar manner, 
management efficiency (M) has a proxy in the form of total expenses (personnel and 
operating) and is regarded as an undesirable input. However, earnings quality (E) has a proxy 
in the form of total net income and is maximised as a desirable output.  Liquidity (L) is 
another desirable output that has a proxy in the form of total liquid assets. Sensitivity to 
market risk (S) is measured by total assets and treated as a desirable output because of the 
role of total assets in impeding default risk (Wanke et al., 2016).  Table 1 lists the 
components of CAMELS  with data sources.     
[Table 1 about here] 
 CAMELS indicators are multi-dimensional risk indicators, being useful for assessing 
the financial vulnerability of banks (Klomp and De Haan, 2012).  DEA is an efficient frontier 
technique which calculates comparative ratios of multi-weighted inputs to multi-weighted 
outputs by using linear programming for each decision-making unit (DMU) (Avkiran, 2011).  
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Accordingly, the application of  DEA to CAMELS serves to deal with, and interact amongst, 
multi-inputs and multi-outputs by minimising inputs and maximising outputs. This provides a 
distinct advantage over traditional risk ratios.   
 Note that a DEA model may suffer from some econometric problems with the 
negative values (Emrouznejad et al., 2010) and the number of DMUs, which should be at 
least twice the total number of output and input indicators (Dyson et al. 2001).  Hence, we 
exclude DMUs with negative values and the number of DMUs can be expressed as: 
               (1) 
 
where   is the total number of inputs and   is the total number of outputs.      is the 
number of banks (the decision-making units).  
 We build a combination model relying on CAMELS rates and standard output-
oriented DEA, using a return-to-scale technique.   Thus, the stability model can be written as 
(Thanassoulis 2001 and Emrouznejad et al. 2010): 
                                                                 
                         
 
  
                              
 
  
                
 
  
                             (2) 
 
The efficiency of      is measured by the optimal value of  , which reflects the stability 
level for each bank,  .   refers to input and   refers to output.     is the actual value of inputs 
                and   is the actual value of outputs                .  
 The empirical model is based on QR, which treats the potential heterogeneity problem 
by exploring a range of conditions related to quantile functions (Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and 
Mamatzakis 2011).  QR is designed to estimate the median of conditional distribution, and it 
is robust with outliers and avoids the assumption that ‘error terms are identically distributed 
at all points of the conditional distribution’ (Klomp and De Haan 2012). We use a 
multiplicative model, which is particularly designed to take account of generated 
heteroscedasticity and simultaneity data (Cameron and Trivedi 2009 and Klomp and De Haan 
2012). The baseline of our QR can be written as: 
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                                                                 (3) 
 
          refers to bank stability for bank   in country   at time  .  The lagged dependent 
variable specified in the model accounts for autoregression.  In order to address simultaneity 
and endogeneity, we take one lag in all explanatory variables (Klomp and De Haan, 2012).   
        is a lagged explanatory variable of type  , namely, Core Profitability Model, capital 
regulation index, activity restrictions, deposit insurance, private monitoring index, official 
supervisory power, government-owned banks, Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), business 
freedom index, GDP, and inflation
2
. The error terms,      and     , reflect errors in bank and 
country, respectively. Note that country and yearly dummies are included in estimating Eq. 
(3)
3
.  The regression is estimated for   (quantiles), where: 
                   (4) 
The quantiles   are the tenth, twenty-fifth, fiftieth, seventy-fifth, and ninetieth4.  
 The standard OLS regression model is given by: 
                   (5) 
 
Eq. (5) can be written as: 
               (6) 
 
where the error    is satisfied by           . 
 The quantile model           is analogous to          in Eq. (5) but does not take 
into account the distribution function of   .  The quantile model is written as: 
                       
      (7) 
where     is the distribution function of    and conditional or dependent on   .  Since this 
may lead to heteroskedasticity in error terms (Cameron and Trivedi 2009), we apply 1000 
bootstrap replications so as to enhance the adequacy of the standard error (Hahn 1995).    
 We examine our quantile model by distinguishing the business model in banks, bank 
size and different stages of economic development across countries  (Haas and Murphy 2003 
                                                          
2
 These explanatory variables are described in Section 3.2. 
3
 Yearly dummies is likely to capture the effect of the sub-prime financial crisis during the sample period.   
4
 We also derived quantile-varying estimates with an increment of 0.05 per quantile, which reflects 19 quantiles 
from 0.05 to 0.95 to ensure the robustness of our results (Lee and Li, 2012).  The results are not presented in this 
paper in order to save space, but available from the authors upon request.   
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and Thompson et al. 2006).  We also re-estimate the effect of the explanatory variables on 
bank stability using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental regression model (Lee and 
Li 2012 and Klomp and De Haan 2012).   
3.2  Definition of explanatory variables 
Efficient banks which maximise profitability are more likely to build strong capital buffers 
and are less liable to be exposed to financial distress (Athanasoglou et al. 2008, Uhde and 
Heimeshoff  2009 and Vives 2011). We specifies the Core Profitability Model (CPM) as a 
proxy for maximising profits and minimising costs by using the input-output technical 
efficiency approach with Eq. (2) (Avkiran 2011 and Avkiran and Cai 2012). CPM consists of 
two cost inputs (total interest expenses and total non-interest expenses) and two profit outputs 
(gross interest and dividend income and total non-interest operating income).   
 The capital regulatory index is specified in the model as a measurement of overall 
capital regulation. The index consists of overall capital stringency which evaluates the 
amount of capital that banks should hold and also initial capital stringency which measures 
certain funds that may initially be utilised to capitalise a bank (Barth et al., 2004).  The 
variable of activity restrictions  indicates the extent to which individual banks are able to 
handle and underwrite securities, to sell and underwrite insurance and to invest in property 
(Barth et al., 2004).  Deposit insurance determines whether deposit insurance authorities have 
the power to make a decision to intervene in a bank and to take legal action against a bank’s 
officers or directors. This variable is also used to determine whether deposit insurance 
authorities have ever taken any legal action against a bank’s officers or directors (Barth et al., 
2013a). 
 Private monitoring index measures whether there are incentives to privately monitor 
banks.   The official supervisory power evaluates whether the supervisory power has the 
power to take concrete actions to correct and prevent problems (Barth et al., 2013a).  The 
variable of Government-owned banks reflects the percentages of a banking system's equity 
which are owned or controlled by a government (Barth et al., 2013a). 
 We utilise the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a proxy of concentration in the 
banking sector. It captures, through squaring, the market share (deposits) for each bank 
competing in the banking sector in each country, and has a range from zero to 10.000 points 
(Al-Muharrami et al., 2006).   
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 This study relies on the worldwide governance indicators (WGI) to investigate the 
impact of governance on financial stability. These indicators reflect six dimensions of 
governance: voice and accountability, government effectiveness, the rule of law, political 
stability, quality of regulation and control of corruption (Kaufmann et al., 2011). We include 
the governance index by calculating the average value of all governance dimensions.  While 
the governance index reflects only the quality of the legal and regulatory environment, the 
business freedom index is more comprehensive. The latter is based on 10 essential 
dimensions grouped into four broad pillars: i) the rule of law, which includes property rights 
and freedom from corruption, ii) limited government, which combines fiscal freedom and 
government spending, iii) regulatory efficiency, which refers to business freedom, labour 
freedom and monetary freedom and iv) the open market, which reflects freedom of trade, 
investment and finance.  
 This study also includes the natural logarithm of GDP to capture the influence of an 
economic growth rate on financial stability.  The consumer price index is used for inflation.     
 Table 1 presents the sources of these variables. 
3.3. Data and descriptive analysis 
In our study, the unbalanced panel data of 2210 banks are used over 17 years from 2000 to 
2016. The sample includes commercial banks, investment banks and bank holding companies 
in 47 European countries. See Appendix for the number of banks for each country.   Unlike 
most financial literature, which has concentrated on listed banks (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga 2010 and Altunbas et al. 2011), our sample includes both listed and unlisted banks.  
Unlisted banks usually reflect significant numbers of small banks (Köhler, 2015) and so the 
inclusion of unlisted banks is likely to articulate the effect of variation in business models and 
bank size on financial stability (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997).   The data set excludes the 
following: i) banks that do not report the values of total assets or LLP. ii) banks with 
headquarters outside European countries, iii) banks with fewer than three years of 
consecutive observations, and iv) banks with outliers in figures, which may reflect errors in 




[Table 2 about here] 
 The summary statistics of the indicators are  found in Table 2.  Winsorising is used 
for the CAMELS  and CPM modelling
5
. The values in the table reflect the overall average for 
all sample countries. CAMELS has an average of 52.3%
6
.  A large standard deviation 
suggests that CAMELS varies widely across banks. The average of the capital regulation 
index is approximately 6.4 out of 10.  The emerging European markets have had a significant 
negative impact on the overall score of capital regulation index, while advanced markets are, 
in general, above the average level, reflecting the stringent capital buffers held in banks in 
advanced countries.  European countries, in general, appear to have relatively fewer 
restrictions regarding non-traditional bank activities with an average of 5.8 out of 12, and 
deposit insurance seems to be weak with 1.1 out of 4.  Moreover,  Government-owned banks 
is relatively low at approximately 17.8%.  It indicates a remarkable shift in Russia and former 
Eastern European countries in the context of privatisation of financial institutions. The 
average value of HHI at 1802 points seems to indicate relatively highly concentrated markets 
in Europe
7
.  A figure of 3.13% GDP growth suggests stable economic growth.  A relatively 
high inflation rate of 4.6% may reflect monetary stimulus policies in some European 
countries and/or may be due to a faster growth in emerging European countries.                    
[Table 3 about here] 
 The cross-correlation matrix between the variables is presented in Table 3. The matrix 
does not show significant correlations between variables except for the correlation coefficient 
between governance index and business freedom index, which records at approximately 0.89.  
Hence, we separately specify each variable in the model: the business freedom index in the 
main analysis and the governance index in the robustness analysis. 
                                                          
5
 Recall that both are estimated based on Eq. [2].  
6
 The estimated stability scores for individual countries are not presented to save space, but available upon 
request from the authors. 
7
 The US merger guideline suggests that HHI exceeding 1800 is deemed to be a highly concentrated market.  
The EU guideline is similar to that of the US.   
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4. Empirical results  
4.1.   Main model 
The estimated parameters of Eq. (3) are presented in Table 4 with five quantile results of 
Q0.10, Q0.25, Q0.50, Q0.75 and Q0.90. The results of OLS are also presented for 
comparison at Column (6).  OLS depends on the approximation of the mean function of 
conditional distribution, which does not provide a complete picture of the influence of 
explanatory variables on stability dispersion across banks.  Quantiles can deliver a clear 
picture about the influence of explanatory variables by distinguishing high and low stability 
banks.  Fig. 1 shows the distribution of explanatory variables.   
[Table 4 and Figure 1 are about here] 
 Table 4 indicates the significant positive impact of most Core Profitability Model 
(CPM) quartiles at least at the 10% level on financial stability, except for Q0.25.  The 
distribution of impact in Fig 1 indicates the sharp increase at Q0.90.  We also observe a 
significant variation in the capital regulation index estimates across quantiles with regard to 
their influence on bank stability. This is particularly evident in Table 4 with the tails of the 
distribution with Q0.10 at approximately 0.174 that is compared with Q0.90 at 0.955.  See 
Figure 1 which shows an upward movement.  
 Greater activity restrictions have a highly significant negative influence on bank 
stability among stable banks, since the coefficients are significant for Q0.75 and Q0.90 at the 
1% and 5% level, respectively. The result suggests that a greater restriction in the number of 
non-traditional financial activities may reduce the ability of banks to diversify risk, thus 
impeding their stability.  The impact of deposit insurance on bank stability is also negative 
and mostly highly significant across various quantiles.  Deposit insurance may motivate a 
bank to relax its restrictions on lending and disrupt the ability of banks to maintain stability.  
This effect seems to be stronger among high-stability banks, as we find that the largest 
coefficient is found at Q0.90 with -1.6.   
 With respect to private monitoring index, we also observe a significant negative 
impact on bank stability across different quantiles.  Similarly, the coefficient on official 
supervisory power shows a negative effect on bank stability.  It is argued that a robust 
supervision is likely to boost the governance of bank lending, contributing to stability (Beck 
et al. 2006b), yet such a role does not seem to be present in our study.   Our result suggests 
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the re-emphasis of the assessment of risk management by supervisors.  The empirical analysis 
indicates that government-owned banks appear to jeopardise bank stability across all 
quantiles, albeit, the stronger effect is felt more at the highest quantiles.  The finding 
demonstrates that bureaucracy in government agencies may lead to weak management, 
corruption and misallocation of resources, decreasing stability in the banking system. 
 Concentration proxied by HHI has a positive significant influence on stability from 
Q0.10 to Q0.75.  This result is consistent with the concentration-stability approach (Uhde and 
Heimeshoff, 2009).  Concentration may generate fewer market players, enhancing monitoring 
power and stability in the banking industry.  Yet, concentration does not seem to exert any 
impact on already stable banks as the coefficient is insignificant at Q0.90.   We also observe a 
significant positive effect of the business (economic) freedom index on  bank stability.  
 With regard to macroeconomic factors, the empirical results reveal that GDP has a 
positive and significant impact on stability across most quantiles. This can be attributed to the 
decreasing probability of default because of stable economic growth.  The variable of  
inflation is not well-determined, and this may have mixed implications for the  banking 
sector.  It is often the case that banks may benefit from inflation by gaining more profit due to 
a higher spread between lending and borrowing rates, however, an inflationary environment 
may increase the uncertainty in the economy, impeding stability in the banking sector. 
 It is noteworthy that, in general, banks in high-stability groups are more heavily 
affected by explanatory variables compared with banks in low-stability groups. A comparison 
of the QR estimates with the OLS estimates indicates that employing the OLS may, indeed, 
lead to misleading conclusions regarding the relationship between bank stability and 
regulations and other determinants.     
4.2. Business models  
In this section, we re-estimate the QR by splitting the sample into three classifications of 
business models: i) commercial banks, ii) investment banks and iii) bank holding companies. 
The empirical results are found in Table 5a. 
[Table 5a and 5b about here] 
 Our result highlights that capital regulation index is, in general, consistent with the 
main results in Table 4 for commercial banks.  The estimated coefficients are positive and 
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significant across different quantiles in commercial banks, though it has a marginal impact on 
stability in other types of banks. This result reflects the nature of risk in commercial banks, 
one of which lies in holding loans, and where banks need to be facilitated with  adequate 
capital as a cushion against potential non- performing loans (Chateau and Wu, 2007).  On the 
other hand, investment banks and bank holding companies have multifaceted businesses 
including brokering, trading, core investments and fund management, thus, capital adequacy 
alone may not be able to promote stability (Radić et al., 2012).  Activity restrictions are 
significantly negative for the median and higher quantiles in commercial banks and also bank 
holding companies; higher quantiles are adversely affected by a tightening of activity 
restrictions.  Deposit insurance authority, Private monitoring index and Official supervisory 
power exert a significantly adverse effect on stability in commercial banks, whilst these 
effects are almost absent in investment banks and bank holding companies.   
 The coefficients of Government-owned banks are significantly negative in most 
quantiles and across different business models, albeit, we see a modest influence in the case 
of bank holding companies.  The results reaffirm the initial main results that greater 
government ownership is a hindrance to bank stability.  The estimates of the coefficients of 
HHI are positive and significant mainly in commercial banks, suggesting commercial banks 
are more sensitive to concentrated markets.  The positive effect of Business freedom index is 
also found only in commercial banks across all quantiles.  
 Overall, the empirical results in Table 5a indicate that commercial banks are more 
sensitive to regulatory shocks.  This is not surprising since commercial banks are heavily 
framed by regulatory bodies as compared with other business models.  
 By extending the analysis of the business model, we also split the sample into listed 
and unlisted banks and generate separate estimates by using quantile regressions.  Listed 
banks differ from unlisted banks in several ways.  For instance, listed banks tend to have a 
more dispersed ownership structure than unlisted banks, providing greater scope for private 
benefits.  In order to protect these benefits, managers of listed banks are likely to take fewer 
risks  (Barry et al. 2011).   However, listed banks tend to be closely monitored by the market, 
hence it is argued that the managers of listed banks expand into more risky non-interest 
income activities to generate a higher return (Köhler, 2015).  Hence there is the possiblity 
that the impact of regulations and supervision on their stability may differ between lsited and 
unlisted banks.    The results are found in Table 5b.   
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 The results for both listed and unlisted banks are, in general, in line with the main 
results in Table 4.  However, it is found that the stability of unlisted banks tends to respond  
with more sensitivity to regulation and supervision, as compared with that of listed banks.  
Notably, Capital regulation index and Deposit insurance are statistically highly significant in 
unlisted banks at Q0.50, Q0.75 and Q0.90.  It is interesting that a greater benefit from capital 
regulation is found in unlisted banks in terms of banks stability.    
4.3  Bank size  
In this section, we re-group our sample into large and small banks based on a median point
8
 
in order to examine any particular features and to avoid bias due to bank size. The estimation 
results are presented in Table 6. 
[Table 6 about here] 
 In general, the results are consistent with our primary findings.  Banks are affected 
positively by CPM. With regard to the Capital regulation index, the positive significant 
coefficients are observed in lower quantiles in large banks, whereas in higher quantiles in 
small banks.  This implies that in small banks, a high stability is likely to be maintained by 
the capital adequacy.  Interestingly, while small banks are adversely affected by activity 
restrictions,  large banks are not sensitive to the variable across most quantiles. However, 
size may prove costly for large banks in terms of deposit insurance, as evidenced by the 
significantly negative coefficients across all quantiles for large banks.  The empirical findings 
also reveal the absence of effects derived from the Private monitoring index, Official 
supervisory power and Government ownership on the stability of large banks, meanwhile, the 
stability of small banks seems to be jeopardised by excessive monitoring and government 
intervention.   HHI, Business freedom index and GDP are almost consistent with our main 
results in Table 4 across large and small banks.  
 Overall, the estimation results appear to demonstrate that smaller banks are more 
sensitive to the shocks from bank regulations, monitoring and supervisory powers.   
4.4  Economic development  
The new global financial system increases the depth of links between advanced and emerging 
economies. Thus, the crises in advanced economies are rapidly and significantly transmitted 
                                                          
8
 The median point of total assets among the banks is US$1212.011 million.   
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to emerging economies (Balakrishnan et al., 2011). Nonetheless, sophisticated application of 
governance, supervision and internal monitoring may enhance the resistance of advanced 
economies to crises. In contrast, poor governance may lead to elevated financial stress in 
emerging economies.  In this section, we split our sample into 20 advanced and 27 emerging 
European countries
9
 in order to examine the impact of financial regulation and supervisory 
power in the different stages of economic development.    
[Table 7 about here] 
 The empirical results are shown in Table 7.  Amongst others, we can observe the 
opposite direction of the coefficients in Private monitoring index and Official supervisory 
power where the positive influence is found for advanced economies and negative for 
emerging economies.  The possible explanation lies in the quality of supervision. For 
instance, sophisticated supervisory agencies may enhance private monitoring by reducing the 
barriers to the conveyance of information, thereby boosting bank stability in advanced 
economies.  Meanwhile, it is argued that in emerging economies supervisors may use their 
power to generate their own benefits by weakening private monitoring, causing instability 
(Barth et al. 2004).  The result also highlights that government-owned banks in advanced 
countries tend to suffer severely from instability.  With regard to other variables,  CPM, 
capital regulation index, HHI, business freedom index and GDP all have a positive impact on 
stability. In contrast, a perverse influence of activity restrictions, deposit insurance, and 
inflation is evident.  These results are similar to our main findings in Table 4.    
4.5  Robustness checks  
[Table 8 and Table 9 about here] 
Governance is one of the main pillars in any financial system and an essential instrument for 
improving stability.  We modify the model specification by replacing Business freedom index 
with Governance index with six dimensions of the WGI to control for the effects of a 
country's governance level on bank stability (see Table 1 for six dimensions).   The results are 
shown in Table 8, where almost all explanatory variables maintain their significance and sign 
of their coefficients in accordance with the main findings. The coefficients on Governance 
index are positive and highly significant, suggesting that a better governance-environment 
helps to increase stability in the banking system.  It is evidenced that the largest effect 
                                                          
9
 See Appendix.   
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measured by the size of the coefficient (at 0.215) is found at a highest quantile of Q0.90,  
implying that better governance is conducive to more stable banks. 
 In order to address the possibility of the endogeneity problem, we employed two step 
estimators.  In fact, bank capital regulations might be endogenous, especially when 
supervisors have obliged banks to raise capital in order to protect themselves against financial 
distress (Köhler 2015).  In the first stage, we estimate capital regulation as an endogenous 
variable, with instrument variables to create the fitted values.   Based on literature on 
financial regulation, specifically, we select IVs of ethnic fractionalisation and legal origins 
that are likely to contribute to the development in financial institutions (Barth et al. 2013b)
10
.  
We also include independence of supervision as an instrumental variable which measures the 
differences in independence from government across supervisory authorities (Klomp and De 
Haan 2012)
11
. In the second stage, we applied quantile regression by replacing the capital 
regulations with fitted values (Angrist et al. 1999).   
 Moreover, we estimated Generalised Method of Moments (GMM).  Studies such as 
Akhter and Daly (2009) and Fonseca and González (2010) suggest that capital regulations 
and bank stability have a tendency to persist over time. Hence, we adopt dynamic panel 
model by incorporating the second lagged dependent variable among regressors, together 
with the second lag on capital regulation, to further check the robustness of our main results.  
This can help deal with inter-temporal risk and banking regulations.  
 The empirical results are found in Table 9.  Overall, the results are supportive to the 
main results in Table 4.  Note that the coefficients of Deposit insurance in regressions (4) and 
(5) and that of Official supervisory power in (6) are not significant amongst the key 
explanatory variables.  Yet, given the fact that the signs on the coefficients are all consistent 
throughout the regressions, the robustness of the main results appears to be sustained.         
                                                          
10
  Ethnic fractionalisation is the average value of five different indices of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation.  
Legal origins identifies the origin of the company law or commercial code of each country.  There are five 
origins: English common law, French commercial Code, German Commercial Code, Scandinavian Commercial 
Code and Socialist Laws.   See Table 1 in Alesina et al. (2003) for a further description of data and sources.      
11
 The definition and data source are found in Table 1 in this paper.   
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5. Conclusion  
In this article, we provided further insight into the effects of financial regulation and 
supervision on bank stability.  We examined the variations of business models, bank size and 
economic development through the CAMELS-DEA rating system combined with a quantile 
technique. The data set covers 2210 European banks from 2000 to 2016. 
 The main empirical results reveal that the capital regulation index variables have a 
positive influence on stability.  The results re-emphasise the importance of capital adequacy 
for bank stability.  The results also show the adverse impact of activity restrictions on 
stability, suggesting that restrictions in non-traditional financial activity jeopardises bank 
stability due to a lower degree of diversification.  Other regulatory and supervisory variables 
also turn out to be causes of instability.  In general, the banks in high-stability groups are  
more responsive to the shocks from regulations and supervision.   
 Clear variations are evident across different business models, where the explanatory 
variables for commercial banks are well-determined for expounding stability, whereas a weak 
effect of regulations and supervision on stability is found across investment banks and bank 
holding companies.  This finding may not be surprising due to the fact that financial 
regulations are more heavily imposed on commercial banks.  With regard to bank size, small 
banks are more sensitive to regulatory shocks as compared with large banks. This suggests 
the importance of financial regulation for small banks to help provide a buffer against 
financial distress.  We also find that while the private monitoring index and official 
supervisory power are negative for stability across emerging economies, their effect is 
positive across advanced economies. This may indicate the better quality of monitoring and 
supervision for the advanced banks.  Furthermore, our extended model reveals that 
governance is still the cornerstone of financial stability and has a positive impact on stability 
across the whole sample.  
 Financial regulation and supervision may enhance or impede stability. Indeed, 
financial policymakers should take into account such variations not only from the 
perspectives of legal and historical backgrounds across countries, but also from the 
perspectives of institutional backgrounds related to banks’ business models, bank size and the 




Appendix: Number of banks across advanced and emerging economies 
   
Emerging countries No. of banks          Advanced countries No. of banks 
ALBANIA 13 AUSTRIA 68 
ANDORRA 3 BELGIUM 23 
BELARUS 21 DENMARK 40 
BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA 27 FINLAND 26 
BULGARIA 20 FRANCE 121 
CROATIA 30 GERMANY 155 
CYPRUS 19 GREECE 9 
CZECH REPUBLIC 17 ICELAND 11 
ESTONIA 9 IRELAND 15 
GIBRALTAR 1 ITALY 89 
HUNGARY 17 LIECHTENSTEIN 1 
KOSOVO 4 LUXEMBOURG 57 
LATVIA 19 MONACO 1 
LITHUANIA 9 NETHERLANDS 33 
MACEDONIA (FYROM) 15 NORWAY 23 
MALTA 12 PORTUGAL 33 
MONTENEGRO 8 SPAIN 51 
POLAND 39 SWEDEN 38 
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA 12 SWITZERLAND 139 
ROMANIA 21 UNITED KINGDOM 136 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 702 ICELAND 11 


















Classification of Advanced and emerging European countries are based on MSCI 
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Table 1: Variables’ definitions and sources of data   
Variables Definitions  Sources 
Dependent variables:   
CAMELS This combination is applied as a proxy of financial 
stability, with two inputs and four outputs as follows: 
Authors’ estimation 
based on Eq. (2) 
Inputs:   
Asset quality Loan loss provision (million/USD) BankScope 
Management Total expenses        (million/USD) BankScope 
Outputs:   
Capital adequacy Total equity             (million/USD) BankScope 
Earnings quality Total net income     (million/USD) BankScope 
Liquidity Liquid assets            (million/USD) BankScope 
Sensitivity of market risk 
(size) 
Total assets             (million/USD) BankScope 
Independent variables:   
Core Profitability Model 
(CPM) 
The CPM consists of two cost inputs and two profit 
outputs as follows:    
Authors’ estimation 
based on Eq. (2) 
Inputs:   
Cost1 Total interest expenses              (million/USD) BankScope 
Cost2 Non-interest expenses               (million/USD) BankScope 
Outputs:   
Profit1 Gross interest dividend income (million/USD) BankScope 
Profit2 Non-interest operating income (million/USD) BankScope 
Capital regulation index This index is used to determine whether the capital 
requirement reflects certain risk elements and deducts 
certain market value losses from capital before 
minimum capital adequacy is determined. Further, 
certain funds, official or otherwise, may initially be 
used to capitalise a bank. The index has a range of 0–
10, with higher values indicating greater stringency. 
 
World Bank Survey 
(Barth et al., 1999, 
2003, 2007, 2012) 
Capital regulation index This index is used to determine whether the capital 
requirement reflects certain risk elements and deducts 
certain market value losses from capital before 
minimum capital adequacy is determined. Further, 
certain funds, official or otherwise, may initially be 
used to capitalise a bank. The index has a range of 0–
10, with higher values indicating greater stringency. 
 
World Bank Survey 
(Barth et al., 1999, 
2003, 2007, 2012) 
Activity 
restrictions 
Overall restrictions on banking activities such as 
securities, insurance, and property activities. The 
restrictions have a range of 0–12, with higher values 
indicating greater restrictiveness. 
 
World Bank Survey 
(Barth et al., 1999, 
2003, 2007, 2012) 
Deposit 
insurance 
This variable is used to determine whether a deposit 
insurance authority has the power to make a decision to 
intervene in a bank and take legal action against a 
bank’s directors or officials. The variable is also used 
to establish whether a deposit insurance authority has 
ever taken any legal action against bank directors or 
officers. The range is 0–4, with higher values 
indicating greater power. 
 
World Bank Survey 
(Barth et al., 1999, 







This index measures whether there are 
incentives/ability to privately monitor companies. The 
private monitoring index is composed of information 
on: (I) compulsory external audits undertaken by 
certified or licensed auditors, (ii) the percentage of the 
10 biggest banks that are rated by international rating 
agencies, (iii) the percentage of the 10 biggest banks 
that are rated by domestic rating agencies, (iv) whether 
depositors were fully compensated the last time a bank 
failed by using a deposit insurance scheme, and (v) 
whether income statements include accrued or 
principal amounts for non-performing loans and 
whether banks should provide consolidated financial 
statements (Barth et al., 2013a).  
The index has a range of 0–12, with higher values 
indicating greater private monitoring. 
 
World Bank Survey 
(Barth et al., 1999, 




This variable is used to determine whether the 
supervisory authorities have the power to take specific 
actions to prevent and correct problems. The range is 
0–16, with higher values indicating greater power. 
 
World Bank Survey 
(Barth et al., 1999, 




The degree to which a supervisory authority is 
independent of government and legally protected from 
the banking industry. The values are 1–3, with higher 
values indicating greater independence. 
 
World Bank Survey 
(Barth et al., 1999, 
2003, 2007, 2012) 
Government-
owned banks 
The extent to which banking system's assets are 
government owned. 
World Bank Survey 
(Barth et al., 1999, 




A concentration index via the HHI Authors’ calculation 
 
 6 Governance 
index  
  
i) Voice and 
accountability 
This indicator measures the extent to which a country’s 
citizens can participate in selecting their government, 
and also measures freedom of expression, freedom of 






This indicator measures the quality of public services, 
the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressure, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of a government’s commitment to such 
policies. 
WGI 
iii)The rule of 
law 
This indicator measures the extent to which agents 
have confidence in, and abide by, the rules of society, 
particularly regarding the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police, and the courts. This indicator 




This indicator measures perceptions of the likelihood 
that a government will be destabilised or overthrown 
by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
political violence and terrorism. 
WGI 
v) Quality of 
regulation 
This indicator measures the ability of a government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulation 
that permit and promote market competition and 





vi) Control of 
corruption 
This indicator measures the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as the 






This index relies on 10 factors grouped into four 
categories: (1) the rule of law (property rights, freedom 
from corruption); (2) limited government (fiscal 
freedom, government spending); (3) regulatory 
efficiency (business freedom, labour freedom, 
monetary freedom); and (4) open markets (trade 
freedom, investment freedom, and financial freedom). 
Index of Economic 
Freedom 




The natural logarithm of GDP. World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 




Table 2: Summary Statistics       
Variables         Obs Mean Std Dev. Min. Max. 
CAMELS (%): Stability 12444 52.33 23.85 16.6 100 
CPM (%): Core Profitability Model 12444 52.65 14.99 0 100 
Capital regulation index 12444 6.39 1.66 2 10 
Activity restrictions 12294 5.84 1.24 0 10 
Deposit Insurance  12294 1.10 0.92 0 4 
Private monitoring index 12294 7.74 1.41 0 11 
Official supervisory power 12294 10.48 2.43 2 15.5 
Government-owned banks (%) 12267 17.68 17.71 0 75.2 
HHI 12444 1801.50 1376.58 153.68 38261.89 
Governance index  12411 69.89 26.06 14.13 108.98 
Business freedom index 12302 65.01 9.83 36.6 82.6 
GDP (%) 11508 3.13 3.58 -5.38 9.96 
Inflation (%) 11204 4.61 4.29 -0.69 15.79 




Table 3: Correlation matrix              
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
CAMELS (1) 1             
CPM (2) 0.1872 1            
 Capital regulation index (3) 0.0139 0.0161 1           
Activity restrictions (4) -0.0745 0.0002 -0.0326 1          
Deposit insurance (5) -0.0631 -0.0833 0.2593 -0.0521 1         
Private monitoring index (6) 0.0749 -0.011 -0.065 0.0312 -0.0792 1        
Official supervisory power (7) -0.0014 -0.0506 0.1313 -0.0138 0.0627 0.0963 1       
Government-owned banks (8) -0.2247 -0.0836 0.0687 -0.0666 0.0238 -0.1365 -0.0309 1      
HHI (9) 0.1463 0.0956 -0.093 -0.0022 -0.2261 -0.0486 0.0056 -0.2842 1     
Governance index (10) 0.3339 0.1673 -0.08 -0.1054 -0.1309 0.153 -0.0234 -0.5998 0.3872 1    
Business freedom index (11) 0.3412 0.1528 -0.0455 -0.1338 -0.1367 0.2382 0.1132 -0.5113 0.2921 0.8872 1   
GDP (12) -0.1219 -0.23 0.0316 -0.031 0.0635 -0.0068 0.0772 0.4711 -0.1967 -0.4057 -0.333 1  
Inflation (13) -0.1955 -0.1128 0.1205 -0.0276 0.0639 -0.0924 -0.0539 0.5752 -0.1818 -0.6303 -0.5732 0.3969 1 




Table 4  Main model with dependant variable CAMELS (Bank stability)   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Q0.10 Q0.25 Q0.50 Q0.75 Q0.90 OLS 
Lagged CAMELS 0.267*** 0.475*** 0.825*** 0.824*** 0.622*** 0.6083*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0128) (0.0148) (0.00650) (0.0174) (0.0090) 
CPM  0.0199** 0.0123 -0.0214* 0.0390*** 0.134*** 0.0307** 
 (0.00907) (0.00975) (0.0120) (0.0140) (0.0315) (0.0140) 
Capital regulation index 0.174** 0.428*** 0.686*** 0.650*** 0.955*** 0.6029*** 
 (0.0755) (0.0798) (0.0961) (0.110) (0.290) (0.1108) 
Activity restrictions  -0.201* -0.123 -0.219* -0.584*** -0.867** -0.4658*** 
 (0.113) (0.107) (0.125) (0.142) (0.433) (0.1523) 
Deposit insurance  -0.237* -0.434*** -0.592*** -0.649*** -1.619*** -0.7275*** 
 (0.142) (0.154) (0.169) (0.205) (0.513) (0.1955) 
Private monitoring index  -0.196** -0.296*** -0.339*** -0.563*** -0.671* 0.0517 
 (0.0845) (0.0844) (0.0890) (0.136) (0.389) (0.1274) 
Official supervisory power  -0.0461 -0.174*** -0.337*** -0.390*** -0.732*** -0.1588
** 
 (0.0513) (0.0504) (0.0614) (0.0854) (0.190) (0.0728) 
Government-owned banks  -0.0273*** -0.0355*** -0.0438*** -0.0281* -0.0673* -0.0479*** 
 (0.00897) (0.00849) (0.0111) (0.0160) (0.0381) (0.0131) 
HHI  0.000477*** 0.000460** 0.000353** 0.000575*** 0.000840 0.0004** 
 (0.000119) (0.000187) (0.000159) (0.000152) (0.000555) (0.0002) 
Business freedom index  0.161*** 0.200*** 0.222*** 0.197*** 0.462*** 0.2914*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0202) (0.0222) (0.0249) (0.0752) (0.0250) 
GDP  0.0862*** 0.212*** 0.266*** 0.210*** 0.192 0.2439*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0328) (0.0459) (0.0643) (0.169) (0.0552) 
Inflation -0.0492* -0.0357 -0.0514 -0.105*** 0.229 -0.0239 
 (0.0251) (0.0341) (0.0373) (0.0397) (0.150) (0.0414) 
Constant 9.925*** 3.991** -1.603 9.849*** 16.21** 0.6939 
 (1.633) (1.559) (1.909) (2.401) (7.205) (2.2333) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 10,998 10,998 10,998 10,998 10,998 10,998 
R2      0.452 
CPM: Core Profitability Model; HHI: Herfindal-Hirschman Index.  
This table presents the QR estimates for our main sample. The dependent variable is bank stability based on CAMELS-DEA. The 
quantiles are reported from columns 1 to 5. Bootstrapped standard errors are based on 1000 replications and are reported in 
parentheses. *** represents p<0.01, ** represents p<0.05 and * represents p<0.1 across all quantiles. OLS regression is reported in 
column 6 with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors for OLS. ± F tests for the equality of the slope coefficient across various 
quantiles have been undertaken and are significant at the 5% level for most quantiles; however, they are not reported in order to save 






















































































































































Commercial banks (1747 banks)             
Q0.10 0.257*** 0.0197* 0.210*** -0.194 -0.252 -0.169* -0.0546 -0.0180* 0.000490*** 0.170*** 0.0619** -0.0526** 
Q0.25 0.454*** 0.0221** 0.487*** -0.0604 -0.376** -0.309*** -0.185*** -0.0226** 0.000671*** 0.201*** 0.241*** -0.0640* 
Q0.50 0.789*** -0.00517 0.806*** -0.0974 -0.570*** -0.392*** -0.352*** -0.0350*** 0.000443*** 0.247*** 0.339*** -0.056 
Q0.75 0.826*** 0.0441*** 0.754*** -0.518*** -0.669*** -0.623*** -0.410*** -0.0169 0.000562*** 0.221*** 0.241*** -0.0985** 
Q0.90 0.661*** 0.132*** 1.063*** -0.710* -1.524*** -0.768** -0.817*** -0.0344 0.000554 0.535*** 0.307* 0.267* 
OLS 0.602*** 0.0368** 0.695*** -0.252* -0.600*** -0.224* -0.379*** -0.0325** 0.000422** 0.323*** 0.317*** -0.0491 
Investment banks (269 banks)             
Q0.10 0.191*** 0.0453** 0.286** 0.736 0.197 -0.913* -0.209 -0.0627** 0.000456 0.103 0.193** -0.00711 
Q0.25 0.392*** 0.0434 -0.155 0.785 0.0316 -0.700 -0.332 -0.0949** -0.00053 0.0952 0.240** -0.0869 
Q0.50 0.782*** -0.0425 0.0631* 1.035 -1.526* -0.801 -0.18 -0.0958* 0.000117 0.085 -0.0253 -0.0733 
Q0.75 0.754*** 0.046 -0.714 -0.634 -1.609 -0.293 0.583 -0.270*** 0.000626 -0.126 -0.113 -0.00522 
Q0.90 0.563*** 0.088 -0.145 -1.56 -1.467* 2.174 1.255 -0.348* 0.0022 -0.936** -0.923 -0.482 
OLS 0.534*** 0.0397 -0.496 0.138 -1.757* 0.224 0.264 -0.189*** 6.52E-05 -0.0984 -0.121 0.00189 
Bank holding companies (194 banks)             
Q0.10 0.493*** -0.00847 -0.409 -2.377 -1.12 -0.74 -0.558 -0.137 0.000548 0.384 -0.3 0.171 
Q0.25 0.780*** 0.043 0.0779 -2.412* -0.298 -0.0442 -0.492 -0.128* 0.000841 0.091 0.533 -0.186 
Q0.50 0.895*** 0.01 0.121** -0.420** 0.572 0.157 -0.256 -0.0364* 0.000531 0.0453 0.234 -0.265* 
Q0.75 0.652*** 0.0453 0.209 -2.494* 0.996 -0.107 -0.68 -0.0703 0.00228** 0.0492 0.371 -0.364 
Q0.90 0.000 -0.002 0.008 -0.000 0.000 -0.012 -0.000 -0.000 0.005 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
OLS 0.580*** 0.0507 0.762 -3.906*** 0.537 -0.201 -0.501 -0.154** 0.00182*** 0.0656 0.650** -0.425*** 
CPM: Core Profitability Model; HHI: Herfindal-Hirschman Index 
This table presents the QR estimates based on banks’ business models. Country and time dummies are specified in respective regressions.  The dependent variable is bank stability 
based on CAMELS-DEA. The quantiles at Q0.10, Q0.25, Q0.50, Q0.75, and Q0.90 for each bank business model are reported in the above table. Bootstrapped standard errors are 
based on 1000 replications, though not reported to save space. *** represents p<0.01, ** represents p<0.05, and * represents p<0.1 across all quantiles. OLS regression is reported for 
each business model, and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are applied for OLS. ± F tests for the equality of the slope coefficient across various quantiles have been undertaken 
and are significant at the 5% level for most quantiles; however, they are not reported in order to save space. The details are available upon request. A number of observations: 






Table5b     Bank listed, unlisted and financial stability             
 Listed 
Banks 
     Unlisted 
Banks 
     
             
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables  Q0.10 Q0.25 Q0.50 Q0.75 Q0.90 OLS Q0.10 Q0.25 Q0.50 Q0.75 Q0.90 OLS 
Lagged dependent 0.377*** 0.666*** 0.913*** 0.826*** 0.620*** 0.690*** 0.228*** 0.410*** 0.710*** 0.808*** 0.641*** 0.557*** 
CPM 0.00741 -0.0218 -0.00338 0.0541** 0.170*** 0.0342* 0.0251** 0.0175 -0.0113 0.0463** 0.0955** 0.0411** 
Capital regulation index 0.328* 0.682*** 0.336** 0.402** 0.399 0.735*** 0.113 0.360*** 0.583*** 0.748*** 1.057*** 0.510*** 
Activity restrictions -0.211 -0.0313* -0.00198** 0.547 -0.180 -0.173 -0.425*** -0.0703 0.00538 -0.254 0.332 -0.0659 
Deposit insurance -0.318 -0.857*** -0.0570 -0.401 -1.315** -0.627* -0.0696 -0.354** -0.704*** -0.702*** -2.139*** -0.842*** 
Private monitoring 
index 
-0.157 -0.392* -0.378*** -0.549** 0.183 -0.183 -0.106 -0.376*** -0.796*** -0.826*** -1.554*** -0.593*** 
Official supervisory 
power 
-0.298** -0.270** -0.376*** -0.281* -0.592** -0.422*** 0.0179 -0.108* -0.163** -0.373*** -0.789*** -0.228*** 
Government-owned 
banks 
-0.0437** -0.0309 -0.0161* 0.0207 0.0576 -0.00812 -0.0147 -0.0279** -0.0531*** -0.0398** -0.0588 -0.0443*** 
HHI -0.00032 -0.000491 0.00098 0.00065** 0.000422* -0.000246 0.000535*** 0.000434** 0.000135 0.000675 0.000626* 0.00087 
Business freedom index 0.153*** 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.252*** 0.543*** 0.397*** 0.153*** 0.197*** 0.248*** 0.267*** 0.536*** 0.324*** 
GDP 0.154** 0.240*** 0.218*** 0.152 0.535* 0.345*** 0.0634* 0.202*** 0.291*** 0.257*** -0.0605 0.251*** 
Inflation -0.0291 -0.0827 -0.0585 -0.00945 0.0735 -0.0298 -0.104*** -0.0995* -0.0735* -0.0853 0.165 -0.0692 
Constant 10.18*** -0.128 -3.555 -0.296 0.0207 -6.316 11.57*** 6.246*** 2.136 5.612* 15.78** 4.878* 
Country dummy Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,097 3,097 3,097 3,097 3,097 3,097 7,915 7,915 7,915 7,915 7,915 7,915 
banks 467 467 467 467 467 467 1743 1743 1743 1743 1743 1743 
R-squared      0.561      0.398 
CPM: Core Profitability Model; HHI: Herfindal-Hirschman Index 
This table presents the QR estimates based on listed and unlisted. The dependent variable is bank stability based on CAMELS-DEA. The quantiles are reported in columns 1 
to 5 and 7 to 11. Bootstrapped standard errors are based on 1000 replications, though not reported to save space. *** represents p<0.01, ** represents p<0.05, and * 
represents p<0.1 across all quantiles. OLS regression is reported in columns 6 and 12 with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors for OLS. The quantiles at Q0.10, Q0.25, 
Q0.50, Q0.75 and Q0.90 are applied across listed banks and unlisted banks. ± F tests for the equality of the slope coefficient across various quantiles have been undertaken 










 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables Q0.10 Q0.25 Q0.50 Q0.75 Q0.90 OLS Q0.10 Q0.25 Q0.50 Q0.75 Q0.90 OLS 
Lagged dependent 0.386*** 0.648*** 0.916*** 0.806*** 0.477*** 0.669*** 0.139*** 0.247*** 0.431*** 0.667*** 0.684*** 0.385*** 
CPM 0.0389** -0.0174 0.00901 0.0557** 0.115*** 0.0581*** 0.0236** 0.0239* 0.0453*** 0.0403 0.0810* 0.0490*** 
Capital regulation 
index 
0.472*** 0.475*** 0.384*** 0.158 0.52 0.509*** -0.000484 0.151 0.462*** 1.178*** 2.069*** 0.563*** 
Activity restrictions 0.194 -0.131 -0.0842 -0.236 -1.333*** -0.373* -0.617*** -0.884*** -1.113*** -1.628*** -2.254*** -1.377*** 
Deposit insurance -0.493*** -0.730*** -0.421** -0.542** -1.467** -0.949*** -0.401* 0.139 -0.199 -0.854** -2.160* -0.648** 
Private monitoring 
index 
0.00113 0.0455 -0.0741 -0.132 0.28 0.0955 -0.333** -0.494** -0.725*** -1.382*** -1.597*** -0.647*** 
Official supervisory 
power 
-0.077 -0.0871 -0.0993 -0.0434 -0.254 -0.155 0.0886* -0.0288 -0.174** -0.174** -0.783*** -0.105* 
Government-owned 
banks 
-0.024 -0.0205 -0.0234* -0.00736 -0.0914* -0.0307 -0.0183 -0.0344*** -0.0578*** -0.0722** -0.0677 -0.056*** 
HHI 0.00032** 0.00023 0.00032** 0.00055*** 0.00054 0.00052** 0.00041** 0.00087*** 0.00099*** 0.00073** 0.0011 0.00065** 
Business freedom index 0.0979*** 0.135*** 0.161*** 0.144*** 0.285*** 0.290*** 0.160*** 0.212*** 0.252*** 0.252*** 0.266*** 0.287*** 
GDP 0.166*** 0.258*** 0.237*** 0.286*** 0.517** 0.419*** 0.0611 0.237*** 0.378*** 0.497*** 0.361 0.366*** 
Inflation 0.00833 -0.0749 -0.0457 -0.0779 0.275 0.0354 -0.00394 -0.0281 -0.00281 -0.0664 0.0381 -0.0134 
Constant 4.183 0.748 -5.676** 8.201** 35.91*** -2.457 16.82*** 14.85*** 12.56*** 17.20*** 32.96*** 16.54*** 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,408 5,408 5,408 5,408 5,408 5,408 
banks 1126 1126 1126 1126 1126 1126 1084 1084 1084 1084 1084 1084 
R-squared      0.50      0.28 
CPM: Core Profitability Model; HHI: Herfindal-Hirschman Index 
This table presents the QR estimates based on bank size. The dependent variable is bank stability based on CAMELS-DEA. The quantiles are reported in columns 1 to 5 and 7 to 11. Bootstrapped 
standard errors are based on 1000 replications, though not reported to save space. *** represents p<0.01, ** represents p<0.05, and * represents p<0.1 across all quantiles. OLS regression is 
reported in columns 6 and 12 with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors for OLS. The quantiles at Q0.10, Q0.25, Q0.50, Q0.75 and Q0.90 are applied across large banks and small banks. ± F 
tests for the equality of the slope coefficient across various quantiles have been undertaken and are significant at the 5% level for most quantiles; however, they are not reported in order to save 




Table 7   Economic development and financial stability 
 Emerging       Advanced      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables Q0.10 Q0.25 Q0.50 Q0.75 Q0.90 OLS Q0.10 Q0.25 Q0.50 Q0.75 Q0.90 OLS 
Lagged dependent 0.194*** 0.321*** 0.518*** 0.791*** 0.784*** 0.508*** 0.305*** 0.575*** 0.899*** 0.823*** 0.520*** 0.643*** 
CPM 0.0137 0.0589*** 0.0876*** 0.0845*** 0.103* 0.0755*** 0.0204 -0.00793 -0.0254 0.0154* 0.0974*** 0.0144 
Capital regulation 
index 
0.0272 0.254** 0.602*** 1.061*** 1.870*** 0.635*** 0.257** 0.249** 0.436*** 0.0965 0.33 0.335** 
Activity restrictions 0.0645 -0.00338 -0.0363 -0.301 0.0275 -0.256 -0.158 -0.0745 0.0792 -0.332** -0.954** -0.248 
Deposit insurance -0.198 -0.472** -0.712*** -0.880** -1.985*** -1.053*** -0.162 -0.510** -0.876*** -0.624** -1.575*** -0.934*** 
Private monitoring 
index 
-0.448*** -0.561*** -0.570*** -0.745** -1.544** -0.771*** 0.277 0.461*** 0.492*** 0.146** 0.84* 0.818*** 
Official supervisory 
power 
-0.0479 -0.245*** -0.598*** -0.953*** -1.452*** -0.477*** 0.0179 0.115** 0.179* 0.241*** 0.162 0.178** 
Government-owned 
banks 
0.00433 0.00154 0.012 0.0511* 0.0795 0.0432** -0.0463*** -0.0592*** -0.099*** -0.0415** -0.171*** -0.118*** 
HHI 0.00033** 0.000176 0.00049 0.000761* 0.00198** 0.000184 0.00080*** 0.00083*** 0.00035** 0.00046** 0.000577 0.00058** 
Business freedom 
index 
0.209*** 0.324*** 0.484*** 0.496*** 0.669*** 0.513*** 0.120*** 0.0692* 0.101** 0.103*** 0.15 0.162*** 
GDP 0.0327 0.235*** 0.406*** 0.432*** 0.502** 0.298*** 0.345*** 0.439*** 0.534*** 0.258*** 0.733*** 0.643*** 
Inflation -0.0169 -0.0267 -0.0337 -0.00684 0.318** 0.00166 -0.270** -0.224** -0.236*** -0.199*** -0.304* -0.253*** 
Constant 10.80*** 2.841 -8.611*** -8.806* -6.541 -4.245 5.643 1.473 -7.355** 8.207** 33.35*** 0.421 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,666 4,666 4,666 4,666 4,666 4,666 6,332 6,332 6,332 6,332 6,332 6,332 
banks 1141 1141 1141 1141 1141 1141 1069 1069 1069 1069 1069 1069 
Countries  27 27 27 27 27 27 20 20 20 20 20 20 
R-squared      0.344      0.445 
CPM: Core Profitability Model; HHI: Herfindal-Hirschman Index 
This table presents the QR estimates based on economic development. The dependent variable is bank stability based on CAMELS-DEA. The quantiles are reported in columns 1 to 5 and from 
7 to 11, Bootstrapped standard errors are based on 1000 replications, though not reported to save space. *** represents p<0.01, ** represents p<0.05, and * represents p<0.1 across all quantiles. 
OLS regression is reported in columns 6 and 12 with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors for OLS. The quantiles at Q0.10, Q0.25, Q0.50, Q0.75 and Q0.90 are applied across emerging 
economies and advanced economies. ± F tests for the equality of the slope coefficient across various quantiles have been undertaken and are significant at the 5% level for most quantiles; 





Table 8     Governance and stability 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Q0.10 Q0.25 Q0.50 Q0.75 Q0.90 OLS 
Lagged dependent 0.263*** 0.479*** 0.832*** 0.824*** 0.619*** 0.613*** 
CPM  0.0219** 0.0137 -0.0194 0.0389*** 0.131*** 0.0280** 
Capital regulation index 0.213*** 0.480*** 0.688*** 0.540*** 1.047*** 0.663*** 
Activity restrictions  -0.224* -0.145 -0.24 -0.556*** -0.872** -0.504*** 
Deposit insurance  -0.350** -0.502*** -0.676*** -0.768*** -1.860*** -0.846*** 
Private monitoring index  -0.107 -0.195** -0.256*** -0.432*** -0.533 0.00406 
Official supervisory 
power  
0.025 -0.0777 -0.199*** -0.242*** -0.485*** -0.200*** 
Government-owned banks  -0.0291*** -0.0296*** -0.0419*** -0.0238 -0.015 -0.0403*** 
HHI  0.000378*** 0.000485** 0.000295* 0.00045*** 0.000342 0.000242 
Governance index  0.0556*** 0.0614*** 0.0659*** 0.0686*** 0.215*** 0.107*** 
GDP  0.103*** 0.206*** 0.273*** 0.162** 0.315* 0.274*** 
Inflation -0.04 -0.0605 -0.064 -0.0687 0.250* -0.0328 
Constant 15.20*** 10.44*** 5.996*** 16.01*** 26.98*** 12.96*** 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,014 11,014 11,014 11,014 11,014 11,014 
R-squared           0.451 
CPM: Core Profitability Model; HHI: Herfindal-Hirschman Index 
The dependent variable is bank stability based on CAMELS-DEA. The quantiles of governance and stability are reported in 
columns 1 to 5. Bootstrapped standard errors are based on 1000 replications, though not reported here to save space.   *** 
represents p<0.01, ** represents p<0.05, and * represents p<0.1 across all quantiles. OLS regression is reported in columns 6 
with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for OLS. The quantiles at Q0.10, Q0.25, Q0.50, Q0.75 and Q0.90 are applied 
for governance and stability estimates. ± F tests for the equality of the slope coefficient across various quantiles have been 
undertaken and are significant at the 5% level for most quantiles; however, they are not reported in order to save space. The 






Table 9    Quantile Fitted Value and GMM       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Q0.10 Q0.25 Q0.50 Q0.75 Q0.90 GMM 
Lagged dependent 0.368*** 0.565*** 0.850*** 0.805*** 0.503*** 0.190*** 
2Lagged dependent       -0.0811 
CPM 0.0353*** 0.0155 0.0176 0.116*** 0.301*** -0.209*** 
Capital regulation (Fitted Values) 0.832 0.756* 0.736 0.817*** 0.730**  
Capital regulation index      0.914*** 
2lagged capital regulation      -0.831 
Activity restrictions -0.234* -0.202* -0.299** -0.228* -0.419 -2.001** 
Deposit insurance -0.202 -0.396*** -0.499*** -0.330 -0.206 -1.679** 
Private monitoring index -0.137 -0.248** -0.280** -0.507*** -0.910*** -1.985*** 
Official supervisory power -0.115** -0.171*** -0.134** -0.205** -0.587*** -0.210 
Government-owned banks -0.0173* -0.0307*** -0.0413*** -0.0250* -0.0721** -0.451*** 
HHI 0.000341* 0.000308** 0.000153 0.000413** 0.000666* 0.000982* 
Business freedom index 0.140*** 0.152*** 0.208*** 0.284*** 0.522*** 0.459* 
GDP 0.126*** 0.206*** 0.186*** 0.136* 0.124 0.255** 
Inflation -0.116*** -0.120** -0.0720 -0.0844** 0.0861 -0.163 
Constant -2.572 -16.69 -18.07 -55.27*** -91.62* 42.01** 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,991 7,991 7,991 7,991 7,991 2,502 
Sargan test (p-value)      0.26 





AR(2)- (p-value)      0.24 
Number of id      483 
CPM: Core Profitability Model; HHI: Herfindal-Hirschman Index 
The dependent variable is bank stability based on CAMELS-DEA. The quantiles of fitted values are reported in columns 1 to 5, based on instrumental variables that ethnic fractionalisation, 
legal origins, and independence of supervision. Bootstrapped standard errors are based on 1000 replications, though not reported here to save space.   *** represents p<0.01, ** represents 
p<0.05, and * represents p<0.1 across all quantiles. GMM-two step regression is reported in columns 6 with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The quantiles at Q0.10, Q0.25, Q0.50, 
Q0.75 and Q0.90 are applied for Capital regulation Fitted values. ± F tests for the equality of the slope coefficient across various quantiles have been undertaken and are significant at the 5% 






Figure 1: The distribution of explanatory variables 
 
CPM: Core Profitability Model; HHI: Herfindal-Hirschman Index 
The figures represent the distribution of explanatory variables at Q10, Q25, Q50, Q75, and Q90. The horizontal 
line represents the quantile at the 0 scale and the grey area represents a confidence band at 95% for QR.  The 
OLS estimator is represented by the broken line. 
